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This paper formulates a simple biomass growth model of a fishery. In this model, fish are 
exploited in a restricted open-access regime where a fixed number of harvesters exploit the 
fish stock in a myopic profit-maximizing manner. It is demonstrated that more modern fishing 
technology has a two-sided profitability effect, where the direct, short-run, positive effect is 
counterbalanced by a negative, long-run, indirect effect that slows population growth. In the 
steady state, it is shown that more modern technology dissipates the rent under already high 
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1. Introduction 
Statistics from the United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) demonstrate 
that many of the world’s fish stocks are depleted, many are overexploited, and only a minor 
part of all wild fishery resources can be said to be in a healthy state (FAO 2005). The reasons 
for this bleak picture include the unregulated nature of many fisheries combined with valuable 
fish stocks. In addition, new and modern fishing technology plays a role (see, e.g., FAO 
2003). The goal of this paper is to take a closer look at the technology side of the debate and, 
from a theoretical point of view, demonstrate how and to what extent modern and more 
efficient harvesting technology may be a disaster for not only the ‘sustainability’ but also the 
profitability of a fishery. Modern fishing technology includes larger and better-equipped 
boats, use of new synthetic materials, new fish-finding equipment and techniques and so 
forth, with calculations indicating that productivity growth over the last few decades has been 
very significant (see, e.g., Eggert and Tveteraas 2007 and the references therein). 
 
The suggestion that new and modern technology can be a ‘bad’ may come as a surprise as 
more efficient technology, at least among economists, has always been seen as a welfare-
improving device (e.g., the pioneering growth-accounting work in Abramovitz 1956). In a 
fishery, however, the blessings of more modern technology depend crucially on the 
institutional structure, and in a regulated fishery with well-defined property rights, new and 
more efficient technology is likely to be beneficial. For example, predictions from the 
standard sole-owner model (or the social planner model, see, e.g., Clark 1990) are that 
improved harvesting technology, ceteris paribus, will increase rents but will reduce fish 
abundance in the long run (the steady state). However, and also following this model, ever-
increasing fishing efficiency will normally never constitute an overexploitation threat
1. 
 
In an unregulated fishery, however, where the fishermen do not price the fish stock (a zero 
shadow price) the picture may be quite different. The so-called open-access fishery has for 
many years served as the benchmark of this exploitation scheme (e.g., Gordon 1954, Homans 
and Wilen 1997). In this paper, we follow this tradition. Our approach is, however, somewhat 
more general as we study the situation where the harvesters exploit the fish stock in a myopic 
profit-maximizing manner: that is, the fishermen maximize short-term profit while taking 
resource abundance as given. Therefore, just as in the standard open-access solution, the 
                                                 
1 It can be easily demonstrated that the utilization approaches the costless harvesting case when efficiency 
approaches infinite.   3
exploiters impose no shadow price on the natural resource stock. However, in contrast to 
standard open-access, the number of harvesters is assumed to be fixed. The exploitation takes 
hence place within a regime what Skonhoft and Solstad (2001), among others, refer to as 
restricted open-access where, contrary to a common property regime, no forms of group 
cohesion and identity –like social norms- are assumed to influence individual behavior
2. 
Contextually, the sort of resource management setting we have in mind may fall within 
Ostom’s (1990) notion of small-scale common-pool resources as for instance inshore 
fisheries, but where economic, cultural and economic changes, in short ‘modernization’, have 
changed the way in which the fishery resources are exploited. Within this resource utilization 
regime it is shown how more modern fishing technology, or improved fishing efficiency, 
influences fish abundance and profitability. The model formulation follows in section two 
while a numerical illustration is offered in section three. Section four concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model 
We consider a simple biomass model (‘a fish is a fish’) exploited instantaneously and 
simultaneously by a fixed number of n identical fishermen. The population growth may 
hence be written as: 
 
(1)  1 () tt t t XX F X n h + =+ − 
 
where t X is the stock size at time t,  t h is the individual harvest, and  ( ) t FX is the natural 
growth function, assumed to be density dependent in a standard manner (see below). 
 
Harvest is governed by the generalized Schaefer function,  tt t hq e X
α β = , with  t e as individual 
effort use and qas the productivity (efficiency) coefficient. This parameter represents the 
technology factor in the model, and a larger qis throughout said to represent more efficient 
or, synonymously, more modern fishing technology. β may be referred to as the stock 
elasticity and α as the input elasticity. The case  1 α β = = is frequently used in the literature 
and coincides with the standard Schäfer harvesting function (again see, e.g., Clark 1990). 
However, for many fish stocks, β may be substantially lower than one (‘schooling stocks’), 
and in many instances, there is good reason to assume a decreasing effort effect so that α  is 
                                                 
2 ‘Restricted open-access’ is synonymous with the more used term ‘unregulated common property’ (see, e.g., 
Baland and Platteau 1996 and Susilowati et al. 2005).   4
also less than one. As follows, 01 α <<  is assumed to hold. For a given harvest price and 
effort cost,  p  and c, respectively, the current individual profit is  tt t t pqe X ce
αβ π = − . 
Maximization for a given stock  0 t X >  yields 
1/(1 ) /(1 ) (/ ) tt ep q cX
α βα α
−− = . Because of lack of 
any strategic interaction among the exploiters, the number of fishermen does not influence the 
individual effort use
34.  Substituted into the harvest function 
gives
/(1 ) /(1 ) (/ ) tt hqp q c X
α αβ α α
−− = . Hence, irrespective of the price-cost ratio and other 
parameter values, harvest will always take place as long the stock size is positive. This is due 
to the fact that the marginal income, when  0 t X > , approaches infinite for a close to zero 
effort use.  
 
The dynamics of the fish stock is completed when the harvest locus is inserted into the stock 
growth equation (1): 
 
(2) 
/(1 ) /(1 )
1 () ( / ) tt t t XX F X n q p q c X
α αβ α α
−−
+ =+ − . 
 
This is a first-order nonlinear difference equation where the dynamics generally depends on 
the initial size of the fish stock as well as the parameterization of the model. However, 
typically there will be no oscillations, and the steady state will be approached monotonically. 
See the classical May (1975) paper but also the numerical section below. It is also seen that 
the parameters of the model have the standard predictions as a higher price–cost 
ratio / pc shifts up the harvest locus and hence reduces the population growth. More effective 
technology and a higherq work in a similar manner. 
 
The steady-state stock is found when 
*
1 tt XX X + ==: 
 
                                                 
3 In renewable harvesting models, strategic interaction is usually channelled through the resource stock resulting 
in reciprocal cost externalities. Under myopic harvesting where the stock is treated as exogenous by the 
exploiters (as here), this type of strategic interaction is hence ruled out. However, there may also be strategic 
interactions through various markets where the product market for fish may be of particular relevance. However, 
this possibility is not explored in this paper as the harvest price is assumed to be fixed and given. 
4 If the number of fishermen is small which typically is the case when considering small-scale common-pool 
resources (see also above), we may imagine that each fishermen takes own harvest effect into account in the 
harvest decision. The profit function may then be rewritten as  () tt t t t pqe X qe X ce
αα β β π =−− . It is easily 
recognized that this effect shifts down the harvest locus (see main text below), but it will not change the outcome 
of model qualitatively.   5
(3) 
*/ ( 1 ) * / ( 1 ) () ( / ) F X nq pq c X
α αβ α α
−− = . 
 
Natural growth is represented by the standard logistic function  () ( 1 /) ttt FX r X X K = − , with 
ras maximum specific growth rate and K as carrying capacity (the maximum number of fish 
that the environment can support in the long run). The steady state 
* 0 X >  determined by 
equation (3) will then be unique. 
 
The current maximum individual profit is 
/(1 ) /(1 ) 1/(1 ) /(1 ) (/ ) (/ ) tt t pq pq c X c pq c X
α αβ α αβ α πα α
−− −− =− , which may be written as 
/(1 ) 1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) /(1 ) () ( / ) tt pq c X
α ααα α β α πα α
−− − − =− after a few rearrangements. The total rent at time 
t is accordingly: 
 
(4) 
/(1 ) 1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) /(1 ) () ( / ) tt np q c X
α ααα α β α αα
−− − − ∏= −  
 
which is positive for any positive stock size. It is seen that more efficient harvesting 
technologyqyields a higher total rent for any given stock size. This direct, short-run, effect, 
however, is counterbalanced by an indirect, long-run, effect as the stock at time t is 
contingent upon previous harvest activity where more efficient harvest technology slows 
down population growth (Eq. 2). The net result of these two effects is generally ambiguous, 
but at least in the beginning, when starting from an arbitrary initial stock value 0 X , the direct, 
short-run, effect will dominate.  
 
At the steady state, we may, however, infer more. The equilibrium rent is 
* /(1 ) 1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) * /(1 ) () ( / ) np q c X
α ααα α β α αα




** (1 ) ( ) pF X α ∏= − . 
 
The equilibrium rent is hence simply proportional to the equilibrium natural growth rate. 
Accordingly, when the biomass grows according to a single-peaked growth function like a 
logistic function, the steady-state rent will be ‘small’ for a high exploitation pressure and a 
‘low’ stock value 
* X , as well as for a ‘low’ exploitation pressure and a ‘high’ stock value.   6
The rent will be at its maximum when
* '( ) 0 FX = , or 
* /2
msy XX K == (msy = maximum 
sustainable yield population). 
 
Through Eq. (3), it is seen that a higher qalways increases the harvesting pressure and works 
in the direction of a lower
* X . Therefore, depending on the price–cost ratio  / pc  and the 
number of exploitersn, more efficient harvest technology will either lower or 
increase
* () FX and hence will either lower or increase 
* ∏ . More specifically, in a situation 
with high exploitation pressure, channeled through a high price–cost ratio ( / p cis low) and 
many harvesters (nis high) or both, we may find that more modern technology yields a lower 
equilibrium rent. The above-mentioned indirect, long-run, effect then dominates in the steady 
state. In the opposite case of a low price–cost ratio and few harvesters, more modern 
technology will produce a higher equilibrium rent, and the above-mentioned direct, short-run, 
effect dominates. See also Figure 1. 
 
Proposition: Fishing technology has a two-sided profitability effect under myopic 
exploitation. Under high exploitation pressure, more efficient harvest technology dissipates 
the equilibrium rent. Under low exploitation pressure, more efficient technology increases the 
equilibrium rent. 
 
  Figure 1 about here 
 
The fact that more efficient (and costless) technology may reduce the profitability of a fishery 
is a counterintuitive result. However, it can be explained by the myopic nature of the fishery. 
The various steady states, as well as the transition paths, are of a second best type, and hence 
exploiters may be better off with less efficient fishing technology, both individually and 
collectively. This possible outcome is in line with the results from the classic externality paper 
by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)
5. Therefore, the above proposition also prevails when there is 
only one harvester ( 1 n = ) with (though somewhat unrealistic) myopic resource utilization. It 
                                                 
5 The general theorem for the second best states that ‘if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a 
constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian conditions, 
although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable’ (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956,  p. 11).  
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contrasts with what is found in the sole-owner model (or social planner model) or in a 
common property regime where the fish stock, in various ways, is priced
6.  
 
3. Numerical illustration 
In the numerical examples, we work with the simple constant-return-to-scale situation 
() 1 α β +=  and  0.5 α = . The individual myopic profit-maximizing harvest is then  tt ha X = , 
where 
2 /2 ap q c = , and the dynamics (2) is  1 () tt t t X X F X naX + = +− . Therefore, the steady 
state condition (3) is found through
** () FX n a X = , or
* (1 / ) XKn a r =−  when applying the 
logistic natural growth function. The current rent (4) is  tt nbX ∏ = , where  /2 bp a = , while 
the equilibrium rent (5) follows simply as 
** (/ 2 )( ) p FX ∏= . 
 
The logistic growth function is given with parameter values  0.5 r = and 5,000 K = (in, say, 
tonnes) while the harvesting price is assumed to be 8.6 (in, say, mill NOK per tonne). For the 
given cost parameterc and number of harvesters n(together with the given fish price), the 
productivity parameter q is scaled such that the benchmark exploitation pressure is 
0.25 na = . Figure 2 yields the stock expansion path when  0 1000 X = . In this figure, two other 
expansion paths for other q-values are also depicted: the ‘high’-efficiency growth path of 
0.30 na = and the ‘low’-efficiency growth path of  0.20 na = .  
 
  Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the accompanying rent paths,  t ∏ . As expected, the most efficient 
technology growth path yields the highest rent during the first period before the benchmark 
case takes over. At this takeover point, the indirect, long-run, profitability effect starts to 
dominate the direct, short-run, effect (section 2 above). At the steady state, the growth path 
with the lowest q-value also yields a higher rent than the most efficient technology case. 
 
  Figure 3 bout here 
 
                                                 
6 In an open access fishery, however, a positive productivity shift may under certain conditions result in an 
inverted U-shaped profit curve (like Figure 1) before a new zero rent situation is reached. Such a transitional 
dynamics pattern is explored in Anderson (1986, Ch.2).    8
Finally, Table 1 shows the steady states of the different growth paths. In addition, the present-
value (PV ) rents are shown (calculated over a period of 50 years with a constant discount 
rent of 5 percent). As the benchmark case is constructed such that 
* /2 2,500
msy XX K ===  
and hence yields the maximum equilibrium natural growth, both the high- and low-technology 
efficiency scenarios yield a lower equilibrium profit (cf. also Figure 2). Therefore, this is the 
numerical demonstration of the above proposition. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper formulates a fishery harvest model where a fixed number of fishermen exploit the 
fish stock in a myopic profit-maximization manner: that is, the fishermen maximize short-
term profit while taking resource abundance as given. Fishery stock growth paths are 
compared for various degrees of technological efficiency, and the two-sided effect on fishery 
rents is demonstrated. When natural growth is governed in a standard density-dependent 
manner, this two-sided effect is found to have a very simple steady-state interpretation, which 
leads to the above proposition. 
 
The present simple model demonstrates that more modern technology may be a ‘bad’ when 
exploitation takes place within an institutional setting where the fishermen do not price the 
fish stock (a zero shadow price) and we are in a second best situation. This happens even if 
the number of fishermen is fixed and there is hence no inflow and outflow of fishing effort 
due to changes in profitability. Therefore, modern fishing equipment may threaten the 
‘sustainability’ as well as the profitability of a fishery when being exploited in a restricted 
open-access (or unregulated common property) manner. As about 90% of the world’s 
fishermen and half of the fish consumed each year are captured by small scale, inshore 
fisheries which often are common pool resources (Ostrom 1990, p. 27), the ‘technology 
threat’ may be a real life situation in many fisheries and local communities in developing 
countries, as well as other places. Susilowati et al. (2005, p. 842), analyzing the mini-purse 
seine fishery of the Java Sea, for example, finds that ‘gains in private technical efficiency 
may…pose a social problem under…unregulated common property through the raising of 
catch rates, increases in ‘effective’ effort and fishing capacity…and further reductions in the 
resource stock’. 
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Figure 2: Stock growth paths. 
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Figure 3: Rent paths 
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Table 1: Harvesting efficiency and steady-states. Stock size (X
*), natural  
growth F(X
* ), rent 
* () Π , and present-value profit  (PV). 
  na  * X   ( )
* FX  
* Π   PV  
Benchmark  0.25  2500 625  2687 43237 
qlow  0.20  2975 602  2590 41358 
qhigh  0.30  1976 597  2569 42205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 